Land Disputes and Sectarianism: The Battlegrounds of Kurram Agency
- Root Causes of Conflict: Ex-FATA's unrest stems from land disputes, sectarian violence, and Taliban influence, particularly in Kurram, Waziristan, and Orakzai.
- Governance and Underdevelopment: The region remains underdeveloped, with ineffective governance models post-merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, lacking accountability and inclusive policies.
- Need for Structural Reforms: Resolving land disputes, improving governance, and fostering economic and social development are essential for sustainable peace.
The former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Ex-FATA) have once again become a focal point for conflicts. Understanding the nature and context of the problem presents a challenge in itself. The fall of Kabul and the Taliban’s ascension to power have altered the dynamics of Ex-FATA, creating uncertainty in comprehending the core issues underlying the conflicts. Upon examination of the fundamental problems, several interconnected factors have been identified as crucial for ensuring sustainable peace in Ex-FATA.
Four primary challenges have emerged that render the merged districts a center of conflicts: land disputes, underdevelopment, governance model, and lack of political consciousness. The Waziristan and Kurram districts are particularly affected by daily occurrences of targeted killings, abductions, road and market blockades, and crossfire over military cantonments.
The road from Parachinar to Peshawar, which passes through Orakzai, has been inaccessible for two years, resulting in shortages of food and medicine. Individuals traveling to Peshawar are compelled to journey via Paktia and Kabul. Due to these attacks, several people from a particular sect have relocated to other cities—primarily Peshawar and Karachi—or have been forced into enclaves, making them vulnerable targets.
The historical challenge of land disputes in the state has been a significant factor in instigating tribal conflicts. The nature of these conflicts in Waziristan and Kurram has evolved over decades. For instance, land disputes in Waziristan exacerbate tribalism among tribes such as Wazir, Mehsud, Dawar, and Burki. In contrast, land disputes in Kurram precipitate sectarian conflict between Shia and Sunni populations. The intensity of armed violence in Kurram surpasses that in Waziristan.
Historically, Kurram was established in 1848, with Parachinar serving as its headquarters. Located in the parrot beak region inside Afghanistan, it is situated less than 100 km from Kabul. The area is inhabited by both Shia and Sunni tribes, including Turi, Bangash, Sayed, Zaimusht, Mangal, Muqbil, Ali Sherazi, Massuzai, and Para Chamkani. Approximately 40% of the region’s 500,000 inhabitants are Shia. Upper Kurram is predominantly inhabited by Turi’s—the only Pashtun tribe that is entirely Shia—while Lower Kurram is primarily inhabited by Sunnis, mostly Bangash.
Longstanding conflict over ownership of forests, hills, land, and water resources between Sunni and Shia tribes has resulted in sporadic incidents of communal violence since the 1930s. However, the massive influx of Afghan refugees in the 1980s caused a significant distortion in the demographic and religious balance of the area. International actors also intensified the sectarian rifts in the 1980s because of the Afghan jihad and the sway of Zia’s Islamization.
Similarly, the conflict in Orakzai primarily centers on the ownership of the Syed Mir Anwar Shah shrine in Kalaya. Originally Shi’a property, the shrine was transferred to Sunni control during British rule, with Shi’as subsequently granted visitation and maintenance privileges. Severe violence erupted in 1927, resulting in the expulsion of all Shi’as from Orakzai. Following the shrine’s renovation in 1999, the local Taliban in 2000 warned the particular sect against returning to Kalaya and even demolished their newly constructed mosque. The Taliban not only displaced them from their fertile regions but also imposed jizya on them.
In October 2006, a week-long conflict over the shrine’s ownership culminated in its destruction. Subsequently, both sects were prohibited from entering the disputed area. Tensions persisted in Kalaya, with a suicide car bombing at a jirga resulting in six fatalities in December 2008.
The sectarian conflict in Orakzai encompasses an economic dimension. Shi’as, who are comparatively affluent, possess substantial properties, including forests and hills. Sunnis impede their timber harvesting and sales. Shi’as had also secured coal mine development contracts but were expelled by the Taliban, who asserted that they had no right to extract coal. The Taliban also levied jizya on approximately 35 long-established Sikh families in Orakzai, expelling them, incinerating their homes, and plundering their businesses. Thirteen Sikh families continue to reside in Lower Orakzai on Shi’a-owned land beyond Taliban control.
Secondly, the ex-FATA region remains underdeveloped in social, political, and administrative aspects, even following its merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Economic underdevelopment results in the inadequacy of political and social structures essential for effective governance. These structures encompass democratic and representative systems, civic organizations, and professional associations. The propensity to compensate for underdeveloped physical or cognitive abilities through focused interest and deliberate practice typically manifests within normative developmental parameters.
In contrast, overcompensation represents a more pronounced drive to achieve beyond conventional limits, often resulting in exceptional accomplishments or excessive perfectionism. Extraordinary overcompensation may engender genius-level performance. Conversely, undercompensation indicates a less proactive, occasionally passive approach to development, often placing undue expectations on external factors or individuals. Therefore, in ex-fata, the federal and provincial governments have a gray-line approach to handling the conflicts.
Lastly, ex-FATA was incorporated into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa but marginalized in terms of governance. The ex-fata governance model failed to adequately address accountability, risk management, responsibility, rule of law, and integrity. The governance in ex-FATA requires structural reforms and the development of inclusive policies with the consent of local populations to resolve land disputes as a priority. To conclude this civil conflict in the ex-fata region, state authorities must address the persistent unrest in the area.
The writer is a researcher from District North Waziristan.
