Beyond Strategic Depth: The TTP’s Revival and the Afghan Taliban
- The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan has emboldened the TTP, leading to increased terrorist activities in Pakistan.
- Khyber Pakhtunkhwa faces intensified attacks as the TTP exploits Afghanistan’s political landscape to regroup and strengthen.
- Despite initial expectations, the Taliban government has failed to curb TTP activities, straining Pakistan’s security and diplomatic stance.
- Pakistan is ramping up military operations and diplomatic pressure on the Afghan Taliban to prevent TTP from using Afghan territory as a safe haven.
The formulation of policies for Taliban-controlled Afghanistan presents a significant challenge for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Pakistan). Despite Pakistan’s continued support for Afghanistan, the country’s new administration may constitute more of a liability than an asset due to the Taliban’s military takeover and subsequent diplomatic and economic isolation. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is a loosely affiliated coalition of Islamist organizations based in Afghanistan that targets Pakistan. Postanistan is emerging as a more substantial security concern for Islamabad, contrary to the misconception that the US withdrawal and the Taliban’s restoration to power in Afghanistan represented a strategic success for Pakistan. The resurgence of TTP in Pakistan following the fall of Kabul presents a challenging situation for the country. These reunifications were part of the TTP’s strategy to strengthen their ranks in anticipation of the post-US withdrawal environment in Afghanistan.
Recently, the TTP has regained its operational capabilities, with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan playing a crucial role in bolstering and empowering the group. To accurately assess the TTP’s current strength, it is essential to evaluate its potential impact on future developments. According to their media outlet, Umar media, the TTP claimed responsibility for 42 attacks in Pakistan last month. These attacks were reported to have occurred predominantly in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region, with 39 attacks there and three in Baluchistan. The claimed attacks purportedly resulted in 130 casualties among security forces, including 58 fatalities. However, independent reports from various think tanks that closely monitor security situations indicate that the TTP was found to be involved in approximately 10 terrorist attacks in March. Despite this lower number, the TTP still managed to execute several significant and impactful attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, specifically targeting army and police officials. Recently, the TTP has adopted an approach of carrying out attacks on police stations, checcheck-posts,ndcanttss acrossnu. Additionally, they have been conducting ambush attacks on the vehicles and convoys of security and law enforcement agencies. The primary rationale for targeting the police force is their role as the initial line of defense.
The police force in KP is inadequately equipped to counter such terrorist attacks. According to experts, the restricted TTP may have been involved in the aforementioned attacks; however, they might opt not to claim responsibility to avoid potential repercussions from the Afghan Taliban. The Afghan Taliban consistently denies any involvement or utilizationof Afghan territory by various militant groups. Among the attacks that occurred, the Peshawar Police Lines attack in January resulted in significant casualties, primarily targeting law enforcement personnel.
Despite the persistent threat from terrorist groups, the security forces in Pakistan have been actively diminishing the operational capabilities of these groups through sustained counterterrorism campaigns. In March, there was an increase in anti-militant operations, with 12 launches compared to six in the previous month. These operations resulted in the neutralization of 34 militants, an increase from 29 in the previous month. Additionally, at a diplomatic level, Pakistan is exerting significant pressure on the Afghan Taliban to prevent the TTP and other terrorist organizations from establishing safe havens. Following the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan, the Afghan army and police, who were trained by the US and its allies, rapidly disintegrated. This situation has left many individuals with limited livelihood options, leading them to consider armed activities as a viable alternative. Former members of the Afghan security forces lack specialized skills and face limited employment prospects in other sectors. Therefore, economic necessity, rather than ideological or romanticized motivations, may drive individuals to join other militant groups.
During the ceasefire phase, militants capitalized on Pakistan’s internal turmoil, which was characterized by political polarization, a change in military command, the ongoing merger process (ex-FATA), the government’s engagement on multiple fronts, including the economic crisis, a change in the federal government, floods, and the unchecked growth of social media. These factors provided a conducive environment for militants to exploit and conduct their activities. It is imperative for state institutions to refrain from politicizing security matters and instead resolve their political conflicts within the framework of the Constitution and political processes. Security challenges have their own distinct dynamics that necessitate careful attention and consideration from both civilian and military leadership. By prioritizing the security of the nation and maintaining a focused approach, effective solutions can be sought and implemented.
The group aims to establish its version of Sharia law in ex-FATA and Pakhtunkhwa (Bannu, Karak, and Lakki Marwat) and has been involved in numerous acts of violence, including suicide bombings, assassinations, and attacks on security forces, government institutions, and civilians. Historically, the TTP has maintained close ties with the Afghan Taliban and other militant groups operating in the region. The fall of Kabul to the Taliban in August 2021 could potentially have an impact on the TTP’s activities. It is noteworthy that the TTP has previously utilized the border regions between Pakistan and Afghanistan as safe havens, exploiting the porous border to launch attacks and seek refuge. The post-Kabul fall period may have several implications for the TTP’s violent behaviour. Collaboration with the Afghan Taliban and TTP could potentially benefit from the Afghan Taliban’s increased influence and control in Afghanistan. Closer coordination and collaboration between these groups may lead to an escalation in violence and cross-border attacks. Recruitment and Mobilization: The TTP could seek to capitalize on the Taliban’s resurgence to enhance its recruitment efforts and mobilize new fighters. The fall of Kabul and the Taliban’s success may serve as a rallying point and source of inspiration for extremist groups such as the TTP. Weapons and resources: TTP might attempt to exploit the new security dynamics in the region to gain access to additional weapons, resources, and funding. This could potentially increase their capacity to carry out violent acts within Pakistan and beyond. Strained relations with Pakistani authorities: If the TTP’s activities intensify following the Kabul fall, it could strain relations between the TTP and the Pakistani government. This may result in increased counterterrorism operations by Pakistani security forces, leading to clashes and further violence. Given the fluid nature of the situation, it is essential to consult reliable sources and up-to-date information to gain a more accurate understanding of the TTP’s post-Kabul fall behavior.
Prior to examining the mechanisms of insurgency in FATA, it is essential to comprehend the local and foreign militant groups situated and operating there. Recent military operations have eliminated the majority of these groups, which had established an extensive terrorist infrastructure in FATA and initiated the insurgency. In addition to recurrent military operations, US-operated drones, as well as internal divisions and conflicts, have weakened these militant groups. While the majority have relocated to Afghanistan, others have moved to other FATA agencies as well as regions of other Pakistani provinces. However, some of these groups are still a major threat to Pakistan and have the power to start low-level insurgencies in FATA.
The views and opinions expressed in this article/paper are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Spine Times.
Tufail Dawar
The writer is a researcher from District North Waziristan.
