Pakistan’s Nuclear Program: A Shield of Sovereignty, Not a Tool of Threat
Discussions about the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear program often arise out of genuine curiosity or concern. However, these inquiries are sometimes driven by underlying political agendas—both domestic and international. From doubts surrounding the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal to speculations over its potential use in conflict, such debates tend to resurface repeatedly. The recent observance of Youm-e-Takbeer (Day of Greatness) on 28 May, commemorating Pakistan’s nuclear tests, reignited these conversations—particularly the ever-contentious question: Who truly deserves credit for Pakistan’s nuclear capability?
To begin with, it is important to clarify that Pakistan has never issued a nuclear threat at the state level. Unlike some nations, its leadership has consistently emphasized that the country’s nuclear program is solely defensive—designed to protect national sovereignty rather than intimidate others. While the program was indeed initiated in response to regional threats, especially from India, Pakistan has never overtly or covertly threatened the use of nuclear weapons. This restraint reflects more than just diplomatic rhetoric; it represents a strategic doctrine rooted in responsibility. Pakistan’s policy has consistently communicated that nuclear capability comes with the duty of restraint—retaliation only if absolutely necessary. This stance signals to the global community that nuclear powers must behave with maturity to prevent escalation and promote regional stability.
Furthermore, concerns over the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have long been a favored point of criticism. In truth, however, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is among the most secure in the world—arguably even more so than those of the United States or Russia in some respects. Unlike many other nuclear states, Pakistan does not maintain its weapons in a ready-to-launch configuration. Instead, the components are stored separately under tight security and are only assembled when absolutely necessary. For example, assembling a nuclear weapon in Pakistan takes several hours and involves a multi-step process that cannot be completed by a single individual. Moreover, any decision to assemble or launch a nuclear weapon must pass through the National Command and Control Authority (NCCA), where no single person holds ultimate authority. Even after assembly, three separate launch codes—each held by different officials—must be entered simultaneously to activate a launch. Without all three codes, the weapon remains inoperable. Notably, international watchdogs such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have inspected Pakistan’s nuclear facilities and consistently rated them as highly secure.
In addition to these security concerns, another recurring question is whether Pakistan has misused its nuclear capabilities. Ironically, the more valid critique is not misuse but underuse—particularly in the civilian energy sector. Nuclear energy presents a powerful solution to Pakistan’s chronic energy crisis, yet the country has only scratched the surface of its potential. Currently, Pakistan operates six nuclear power plants located in Chashma and Karachi, contributing about 17% of the country’s total electricity production. According to nuclear experts, running these plants demands serious responsibility, and Pakistan has remained cautious—fully aware that any mishap, such as the Chernobyl disaster or India’s Bhabha reactor leakage, could have catastrophic consequences. Thus, the country’s approach to nuclear energy remains careful and calculated, reflecting its broader commitment to responsible use.
Equally important is the need to acknowledge the collective effort behind Pakistan’s nuclear achievement. Moving beyond political biases and rival narratives requires us to give credit where it is due. The visionary leadership of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto laid the foundation for the program—he dared to imagine a secure and self-reliant Pakistan. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the scientific mastermind, led a team of brilliant scientists who translated that vision into reality. When international pressure was at its peak, the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif demonstrated the political courage to authorize the nuclear tests. The Pakistan Army’s engineering corps then operationalized the vision by conducting the tests in the Chagai mountains—an act that symbolized unity, resolve, and resilience.
Ultimately, Pakistan’s nuclear program is not a symbol of aggression—it is the cornerstone of national security, developed not out of ambition but out of necessity in an unpredictable regional environment. While political debates and rivalries are natural in any democracy, dragging such a vital national asset into the realm of political point-scoring weakens the very unity that made it possible. The state must treat this capability with the seriousness it deserves—one rooted in national interest, free from partisan agendas, and focused on long-term security and responsible use.
The views and opinions expressed in this article/paper are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Spine Times.
Abid Hassan
The writer is a political analyst and emerging scholar of international relations at the International Islamic University Islamabad, with research interests in defense, diplomacy, and South Asian conflict dynamics.
